Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint by Boyd, Dallas
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011-05-00
Protecting Sensitive Information: The
Virtue of Self-Restraint
Boyd, Dallas
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (May 2011), v.7
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/24977
Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint
Dallas Boyd
ABSTRACT
An abundance of information that could be 
useful to terrorists  is  available  in the open 
literature. This  information,  unclassified but 
nonetheless  sensit ive,  includes r isk 
assessments that identify infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, analyses that hypothesize 
creative  attacks, and otherwise  dangerous 
knowledge that is  released under the rubric 
of scientific openness  or the public’s  “right to 
know.” Attempts  to manage this  information 
more responsibly have been resisted in part 
due to the misconception that such efforts 
would require  formal, draconian restrictions 
on speech. However,  greater discipline in the 
dissemination of sensitive information can 
be introduced without compromising the 
nation’s  values. In particularly sensitive 
areas,  scientists, journalists,  and members of 
the general public should embrace voluntary 
self-restraint as  a civic  duty. Further, both 
government entities  and journalists  should 
avoid call ing attention to  sensitive 
information in ways that compound rather 
than reduce the potential harm it represents.
INTRODUCTION
Less than  a  year  after  the Cold War ended, 
one of its best-kept  secrets came to light 
when  the hidden purpose of West  Virginia’s 
Greenbrier  Hotel  was revealed in  the 
Washington Post.1  Beneath  the hotel  was a 
massive bunker  built to house the U.S. 
Congress after  a  nuclear  war, part  of the 
nation’s “continuity  of government”  program. 
Though  congressional leaders had urged the 
newspaper  not  to expose the secret, the Post’s 
executive editor  justified the publication  as a 
“historically  significant and interesting  story 
that  posed no grave danger  to national 
security  or  human  life.” 2  Ted Gup,  the 
journalist  who uncovered the Greenbrier’s 
macabre function, went  further,  arguing that 
the facility  had been  potentially  destabilizing 
even when  its existence was a  secret. 
Evacuating  Congress during  a  crisis might 
have telegraphed that  the United States was 
bracing  for  nuclear  war, precipitating  a  Soviet 
first-strike. Far  from  an act  of irresponsible 
journalism,  Gup cited the story  as a  case 
study  in the value of an  inquisitive press 
corps.3
Though  lawmakers quickly  acknowledged 
the Greenbrier’s obsolescence, the revelation 
remains controversial.4  Despite a  plea for 
discretion,  a  small number  of journalists had 
substituted their  own  judgment on  national 
security  for  that  of the U.S.  defense 
establishment. The tension  that  the story 
illuminated – between the value gained by 
revealing  sensitive information  and the 
potential harm  invited by  doing  so – has only 
grown  more pronounced since terrorism 
emerged as the dominant security  threat. 
This tension  usually  concerns information 
that,  like the bunker  location,  has been 
formally  designated as secret.  Most  recently, 
WikiLeaks’ release of more than  a  half-
million  classified documents has revived 
debate over  the legitimacy  of leaking  as a 
form  of civil disobedience. 5 However,  a  more 
complex question concerns the advisability  of 
making  public, or  drawing  attention to, a 
variety  of mostly  unclassified information 
that is nonetheless useful to terrorists.6 
Examples of this information  include media 
descriptions of target  vulnerabilities, 
hypothetical attack  scenarios,  and sensitive 
counterterrorism  measures. The central 
question  explored in  this article  is whether 
the availability  of this unclassified knowledge 
benefits our adversaries more than  it 
advantages society.  
The motives behind disclosures of 
sensitive information  vary,  but  a common 
refrain  is that they  spur  remedial action  that 
would otherwise be avoided. Critics argue, 
however, that  these revelations recklessly 
endanger  the public.  Whatever  their  effect,  a 
soft consensus seems to have formed that 
airing  this information  does not  subtract 
from  national security  to such  an  extent as to 
justify  the extraordinary  powers that  would 
be required to suppress it. This attitude 
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represents a  stark departure from  previous 
wartime policy,  when  speech  was frequently 
restricted on  security  grounds.7 During World 
War II,  censorship succeeded largely  because 
communications technology  had not yet 
made the practice impractical. Since then, the 
information  revolution  has greatly  expanded 
the number  of people with  access to sensitive 
information  as well as the means to 
disseminate it.  Attempts to manage this 
information  have been  less than  vigorous, 
and in many  cases the government itself has 
made questionable revelations in  the name of 
greater transparency.  
The existence of sensitive information  in 
the public  domain is a  security  concern  only 
insofar  as there are adversaries poised to 
exploit it.  Yet on this score there can  be little 
doubt. Gathering information  from  open 
sources is an  established intelligence 
methodology  that  both  states and non-state 
actors utilize.  For  example, Chinese 
physicists relied heavily  on  Western  scientific 
literature in  their  development  of strategic 
weapons.8  Modern-day  terrorists appear  to 
behave similarly.  A  captured al-Qaeda 
training manual released by  the Justice 
Department after  9/11  advises that  by  using 
public sources “openly  and without  resorting 
to illegal means,  it is possible to gather  at 
least  80% of information  about the enemy.” 
Among  the sources it  recommends are 
“newspapers,  magazines, books,  periodicals, 
official publications, and enemy  broadcasts.” 9 
The diversity  of malevolent  actors who might 
exploit this information  has also grown 
dramatically  over  the previous decades. In 
the age of terrorism, the incoherence of the 
nation’s response to this phenomenon 
represents a significant failure.  
This article examines three common forms 
of “sensitive information,”  defined for the 
purpose of this analysis as knowledge that 
might  be useful to terrorists and would be 
considerably  more difficult  – if not 
impossible  – for  them  to assemble 
independently. This information includes: 
media  reports and risk assessments,  both 
private and government-sponsored,  that 
identify  critical vulnerabilities to terrorism; 
open-source analyses that  hypothesize 
creative terrorist  attacks; and publications 
that  reveal potentially  dangerous knowledge 
under the rubric  of scientific openness or,  in 
the case of classified information,  the public’s 
“right to know.” The purpose of the analysis 
is to challenge the assumption  that  these 
revelations are largely  innocuous. A  further 
aim  is to dispute the notion  that curtailing 
t h e m  r e q u i r e s m e a s u r e s t h a t a r e 
incompatible with  our  national values. This 
misconception  encourages the belief that  any 
effort  to discourage discussion  of sensitive 
information compromises civil liberties.
An alternative to draconian  restrictions on 
speech  entails fostering  a culture of voluntary 
restraint, in  which  citizens refrain from 
inappropriate revelations out of a  sense of 
civic  duty.  Its enforcement  would depend not 
on  government  coercion  but on individuals 
and institutions supplying disapproval of 
irresponsible discussion. Admittedly, any 
effort  to discourage discussion of unclassified 
knowledge, no matter  how  sensitive, faces an 
obvious hurdle: persuading  the public  to 
accept new  categor ies o f protected 
information  just as the government struggles 
to keep secret  the materials it has already 
classified.   But  the challenge of safeguarding 
the two types of information  is different. One 
requires more diligent  enforcement  of 
existing security  protocols.  The other  is a 
societal responsibility  that  presents no 
additional burden  to the government beyond 
promoting  its merits. While the debate over 
the discussion of unclassified information is 
not likely  to resume until another  attack 
occurs,  policymakers should revisit  the 
matter  before that inevitable event.  In its 
aftermath, impulsive calls to curtail American 
rights may  obscure the more measured 
option that is available today.
ADVERTISING VULNERABILITIES
The emergence of terrorism  has occasioned 
the reevaluation  of what  had been a  steady 
increase in  transparency  across many  sectors 
of society.  The shift in  attitude concerning 
knowledge of natural gas line locations is 
instructive.   For  decades errant  digging  had 
occasionally  punctured pipes containing 
explosive gas, with  lethal results.  Industry 
and government responded by  advertising 
their  location  as widely  as possible.  After 
9/11,  however,  a  series of reports highlighting 
the possibility  of natural gas attacks led some 
to question  the wisdom  of this effort.  A  2004 
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New  York  Times  headline captures the 
dilemma: “Mapping  Natural Gas Lines: 
Advise the Public, Tip Off the Terrorists.”  In 
response to these concerns, pipeline maps 
began  to be  removed from  many  gas 
company  web sites.10  Similar  fears have 
arisen in  other  countries.  In  2008,  flood risk 
experts in  Britain’s Environment  Agency 
incurred the wrath  of security  officials when 
they  published maps depicting  regions under 
severe threat  in  the event  of dam  failures.11 As 
in  the United States,  however,  such 
objections have been  inconsistent, leaving 
unresolved the question of whether  society  is 
better served by openness or discretion.  
Reactions to the identification  of 
vulnerabilities can  generally  be divided into 
two schools of thought. The first  contends 
that vulnerability  assessments are often 
indistinguishable from  terrorists’ target 
research  and should therefore be closely 
guarded.  In keeping  with  this view,  Dennis 
Pluchinsky,  a  former  State Department 
intelligence analyst, facetiously  accused the 
American  media  of “treason”  for  its post-9/11 
security  coverage, which  he suggested had 
“clearly  identified for  terrorist groups the 
country’s vulnerabilities.”12  The opposing 
view  is that identifying  security  gaps has a 
mostly  salutary  effect. As Georgetown  Law 
Professor Laura  Donohue argues,  “Citizens 
are entitled to know  when  their milk,  their 
water,  their  bridges,  their  hospitals lack 
security  precautions.  If discussion  of these 
issues is censored,  the state and private 
industry  come under  less pressure to alter 
behavior…”13 Of course,  these outcomes are 
not mutually  exclusive – publicizing 
vulnerabilities may  simultaneously  alert 
terrorists to promising  targets and prompt 
policymakers to protect  them. In  these cases, 
the crucial  question  is whether  the benefit of 
identifying a  vulnerability  outweighs the 
possibility  that the likelihood of its being 
exploited will increase. Since 9/11, many 
commentators have taken  this wager, as a 
brief review of the literature illustrates.
In  2005, Slate writer  Andy  Bowers 
published instructions on  how  to exploit  a 
loophole in  the No-Fly  List  using online 
check-in. This convenience allows travelers to 
print  boarding passes at  home and proceed 
directly  to airport security,  where they 
p r e s e n t  s o m e f o r m  o f g o v e r n m e n t 
identification. While the names on the pass 
and ID must  match,  the Transportation 
Security  Administration (TSA) does not  scan 
the barcode or  compare the name against  the 
No-Fly  List.  Only  at  the gate is the boarding 
pass scanned,  but  no matching  identification 
is required.  Bowers suggests that  terrorists 
could travel with  two boarding passes – one 
legitimate,  purchased with a  stolen  credit 
card, and the other a  counterfeit created 
using  widely  available software.  At  the first 
checkpoint, the passenger will pass through 
as long as the fake pass corresponds with  the 
ID.  The scan of the genuine pass at  the gate 
will not  register  alarm  because it contains an 
innocent  name. Bowers justified this 
revelation  with  a  familiar  defense – if he 
could discern  the loophole, “any  terrorist 
worth  his AK-47  realized it  a  long time ago.”14 
In  another  piece,  journalist  Jeffrey  Goldberg 
provided a  recipe for  fabricating  a  homemade 
knife in  flight  with  steel epoxy  glue: “It  comes 
in  two tubes, one with  steel  dust and then  a 
hardener.  You  make the mold by  folding  a 
piece of cardboard in  two, and then  you  mix 
the two tubes together…. It  hardens in  15 
minutes.” 15 Goldberg  also described passing 
through  security  wearing  under  his shirt  a 
polyurethane bladder  designed to sneak 80 
ounces of alcohol into sporting  events, 
presumably  sufficient to hold enough  liquid 
explosives to destroy an aircraft in flight. 16
A  frequent target of journalistic exposés is 
the security  surrounding  the nation’s critical 
infrastructure, particularly  facilities that 
manufacture or  store dangerous materials. In 
one “60  Minutes”  investigation  in  2004, 
camera  crews infiltrated several  chemical 
plants to demonstrate their  susceptibility  to 
terrorism. 17  Though  these investigations 
often  contain  sensationalist  or  self-
congratulatory  undertones,  such  reporting 
can  still  be  done responsibly. In  2005,  for 
example,  ABC News investigated the security 
at  nuclear  research  reactors on  25  university 
campuses using  undercover  graduate 
students to penetrate  the sites.18 The laxity  of 
the security  would later be featured in  a 
televised special on vulnerable nuclear  sites. 
However,  six  weeks before the broadcast, the 
investigative team  disclosed its findings to 
university  of f ic ials and government 
personnel, allowing time to heighten  security 
at  the facilities. In  doing  so, a  program  that 
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might  have instantly  increased a  security 
threat  was limited to a  mere embarrassment 
for the universities.
Government as the Source of Sensitive 
Information
Despite the practice of “overclassification,”  in 
which  the government makes secret  an 
a b u n d a n c e o f i n n o c u o u s m a t e r i a l , 
government  reports are ironically  the source 
of much  sensitive information.19 The Smyth 
Report,  the unclassified history  of the 
Manhattan Project,  provides a  useful 
lesson.20 Released in  August  1945,  the report 
had several purposes: to educate  the public 
about  the atomic bomb,  showcase openness 
in  government, and signal  what  could and 
could not  be said about  the new  weapon. A 
debate raged over  whether  the report 
revealed too much  –physicist  Leó Szilárd 
claimed it  “clearly  indicates the road along 
which  any  other  nations will have to travel”  – 
but officials ultimately  judged that  nothing 
vital was revealed.21  However,  historian 
Michael  Gordin  argues that  the Smyth  Report 
was in  fact  “crucial  for  the Soviet  [bomb] 
project—perhaps the most  important single 
source of American information....”  Thirty 
thousand translations were  distributed to 
Soviet  research  institutes.  According to 
Gordin, had the report not existed, “the 
Soviets would have had to write a  guidebook 
of their  own. Smyth  saved them  the 
trouble....” 22  Dr.  Khidhir  Hamza,  an  Iraqi 
weapon scientist  who defected in 1994, 
recalled using  the same materials in  Saddam 
Hussein’s nuclear  program. He later wrote,  “I 
was sure that  if U.S.  officials knew  how 
valuable its Manhattan Project  reports would 
be to us years later, they  would have kicked 
themselves.” 23 
The practice of revealing sensitive 
information  for  the sake of openness in 
g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e s t o d a y . T h e 
Government Accountability  Office (GAO), for 
example,  regularly  scandalizes Congress and 
the media  with  revelations of slipshod 
security  practices. A  typical  report  in  2007 
described the ease with  which  undercover 
agents passed through  airport  security  with 
concealed bomb components. 24  Beyond 
confirming the practicality  of this attack 
mode, the report provided clues on  the 
simulated bomb design that an  astute 
terrorist  might  have perceived.  A  later  report 
catalogued deficiencies in the security 
surrounding  the nation’s biosafety  level 4 
laboratories, which  house pathogens such  as 
Ebola and smallpox.25  Another provided 
details of the behavioral  profiling  techniques 
that  TSA  uses to screen for  suspicious airline 
passengers.26 These reports are made public 
despite evidence that  terrorists are aware of 
them. Indeed,  in 2010,  an  al Qaeda affiliate 
released an  English-language document 
detailing  its attempt  to detonate explosives 
on two U.S.-bound cargo aircraft; the 
document referenced a  GAO assessment of 
cargo inspection  methods,  demonstrating  the 
network’s awareness of this source of 
information.27
These revelations would be  beneficial  if 
they  consistently  prompted corrective  action, 
but in  many  cases they  do not,  as an  earlier 
series of reports illustrates.  In  2003,  GAO 
provided a  virtual  guide to collecting  material 
for  a  radiological  dispersal  device (RDD), 
which  could easily  be obtained due to 
weaknesses in  the Nuclear  Regulatory 
C o m m i s s i o n ’ s ( N R C ) l i c e n s i n g 
process. 28 Four  years later, an investigation 
revealed that these weaknesses had not  been 
addressed. After  establishing  a  sham  business 
with  only  a  post  office box,  investigators 
acquired a  license to receive radioactive 
materials and then  doctored it to permit 
unlimited acquisition  of sources.  The 
investigators then  contracted with  two U.S. 
suppliers to purchase moisture density 
gauges containing  enough  americium-241 
and cesium-137  to construct an  RDD.29 While 
this investigation  finally  forced the NRC to 
suspend i ts l i censing program,  the 
government  has identified other  security  gaps 
where the potential  for  timely  remediation  is 
severely limited.  
Numerous reports have advertised 
shortcomings in  the architecture  to detect 
smuggled nuclear  weapons, particularly  the 
inability  of radiation  portal  monitors at  U.S. 
seaports to detect  “shielded”  nuclear 
material. 30  Others have documented the 
virtual absence of scanning  for  railcars and 
small watercraft entering  the country.31  This 
information  greatly  reduces terrorists’ 
uncertainty  about  the obstacles they  face in 
conducting  an  attack. Micah  D.  Lowenthal 
draws on  scholarship concerning criminal 
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behavior  to demonstrate  how  this knowledge 
hinders our  ability  to deter nuclear  terrorism. 
Specifically,  he cites a  study  on  the 
effectiveness of the Lojack car  retrieval 
system, an  unobservable transmitter  that 
allows police to track stolen  vehicles.  While 
visible theft-deterrent devices such  as 
steering wheel locks simply  shift  thieves’ 
energies to neighboring  cars, Lojack 
produced broad reductions in  overall theft.32 
The explanation  is simple: criminals are 
aware that  the device is used but  are unable 
to identify  which  cars have it.   Lowenthal 
argues that  a  similar  phenomenon  may  occur 
with  nuclear  terrorism,  in  which  “the 
existence of some radiation  monitoring  at 
seaports and land border  crossings may 
deflect  adversaries, causing them  to focus on 
other  gaps…that are identified as easier 
targets.” 33  Disclosing  information on  the 
detection  architecture therefore guarantees 
that  it will have little effect on  the overall risk. 
By  contrast,  deliberate ambiguity  about  U.S. 
defenses might  deter terrorists from 
attempting  a  nuclear  attack in  the first  place. 
At the least, such  a  policy  would avoid 
steering them  toward the least defended 
entry points.
The preceding  anecdotes concern  attack 
vectors that are, in  all likelihood,  already 
familiar  to terrorists.  While this information 
may  make an  attack easier  to plan or  more 
likely  to succeed, a  determined adversary 
may  be able to perform  the necessary 
research  without assistance. An altogether 
different category  of sensitive information 
consists of novel ideas for  attacks that  may 
not have occurred to the most  imaginative 
adversaries. Managing  discussion  of these 
scenarios presents a  special challenge, as the 
creativity  of the 9/11  attacks ensured that 
exercises in  innovative thinking  would find a 
receptive audience in  both the government 
and the popular culture.
POSITING CREATIVE SCENARIOS
After  9/11,  conceiving  novel  means of 
wreaking havoc became something  of a 
fiendish  hobby  for  many  analysts. 34  One 
group of authors,  noting the proliferation  of 
hypothetical scenarios in the public  domain, 
suggested that  their  source must be a 
basement where “thousands of monkeys who 
have yet  to type out  exact  copies of the works 
of Shakespeare are nonetheless producing 
dozens of new  ideas for  attacks on 
America...” 35 Many  of these scenarios follow  a 
familiar  template.  “At  3  a.m. on a  moonless 
night,” begins one fictitious plot  in  IEEE 
Spectrum,  “a  pair  of armored vans race down 
an  access road leading up to the sprawling 
Hovensa  oil  refinery.…” 36 Another  scenario 
by  Thomas Homer-Dixon  (which  begins at 4 
a.m. on  a  “sweltering”  night rather than a 
“moonless”  one) involves an  assault  on  the 
electricity grid during a heat wave:
In  different parts  of [California], half a 
dozen small  groups of  men  and women 
gather. Each  travels in a  rented minivan  to 
its prearranged destination – for some, a 
location  outside one of the hundreds of 
electrical  substations dotting  the state; for 
others, a  spot upwind from key, high-
voltage transmission  lines…. Those 
outside the substations put together 
simple mortars made from materials 
bought at local  hardware stores, while 
those near the transmission lines use 
helium to inflate weather  balloons with 
long, si lvery tails. At a precisely 
coordinated moment, the homemade 
mortars are fired, sending showers of 
aluminum chaff over the substations. The 
balloons are released and drift into the 
transmission  lines. Simultaneously, other 
groups are doing the same thing  along the 
Eastern Seaboard and in  the South and 
Southwest. A national electrical  system 
already  under  immense strain is massively 
short-circuited, causing a  cascade of 
power failures across the country. Traffic 
lights shut off.  Water and sewage systems 
are disabled.  Communications systems 
break down. The financial  system  and 
national  economy come screeching  to a 
halt.37
Innumerable scenarios of this ilk  have 
been  described in  the public domain,  ranging 
from  infecting livestock with  contagious 
diseases to setting  serial forest  fires. 38 
Security  expert Bruce Schneier  holds a 
perennial “Movie-Plot Threat Contest,” 
inviting participants to propose attack 
scenarios that are “horrific and completely 
ridiculous, but  plausible.”  The plots are 
reliably  dramatic: irradiating Wall Street with 
radiological bombs,  crashing  explosives-filled 
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airplanes into the Grand Coulee Dam,  and so 
on.39 The government  evidently  sees value in 
such  exercises, in  part because the 9/11 
Commission  identified the  failure of 
“imagination”  as first  among  the deficiencies 
that  contributed to the tragedy.40  Shortly 
after  the attacks, then-National Security 
Advisor  Condoleezza  Rice famously  asserted, 
“I don’t think anybody  could have predicted 
that these people…would try  to use an 
airplane as a missile.” 41 Rice’s statement  was 
soon  discovered to be incorrect – more than  a 
dozen references to hijacked planes-cum-
guided missiles were identified after  the 
attacks. One 1999  report  speculated that  al 
Qaeda’s suicide bombers “could crash-land 
an  aircraft  packed with  high  explosives…into 
the Pentagon, the headquarters of the [CIA], 
or the White House.” 42 
T h e g o v e r n m e n t  s u b s e q u e n t l y 
commissioned a series of exercises to capture 
some of the creativity  that  had so disastrously 
eluded its analysts. In one program, the 
Army-funded Inst i tute for  Creat ive 
Technology  enlisted Hollywood screenwriters 
and directors to conjure up frightening attack 
scenarios. 43 Yet  the products of these sessions 
remained off-limits to public  scrutiny. As one 
official explained, “Our  worst  nightmare was 
that  we would suggest scenarios to 
terrorists.” 44 Marvin  Cetron, a  “futurist”  who 
credits himself with  having foreseen the 9/11 
attacks, claims that the State Department 
removed his prediction from  a  1994 
government  report for fear that  it  might “give 
terrorists a  valuable idea  they  might  not 
conceive on their own.” 45  
Cetron  has found a  more receptive market 
for  his powers of discernment  after  9/11  – he 
has since published several l ists of 
“unthinkable”  terrorist  plots ranging  from 
destroying  Tennessee Valley  Authority  dams 
to bombing  a  liquefied natural gas tanker 
near a  major  city.46 While such  scenarios are 
often farcical, they  occasionally  produce 
useful insights. In  one analysis,  James Acton 
et al. suggest several innovative means of 
disseminating  radiological materal  beyond 
the standard “dirty  bomb,”  in  which 
radioactive  material  is simply  mixed with 
e x p l o s i v e s . 47  T h o u g h  t h e c o m m o n 
assumption is that  such  a  device would 
produce catastrophic effects, the authors 
argue that the death  toll would be “very 
unlikely  to reach three figures.”  By  contrast, 
attacks involving  ingestion, inhalation,  and 
immersion of radiation,  which  they  dub I3 
attacks, may  claim  an  order  of magnitude 
more victims and would be less technically 
challenging to carry  out. 48  While their 
analysis stops short  of providing  instructions 
to terrorists, the authors have arguably 
p r o v i d e d s e v e r a l k e r n e l s o f u s e f u l 
information.
Just  as in  the case of advertising 
vulnerabilities,  government  officials are often 
the source of worrisome scenarios. In  2009, 
for  example,  Charles R. Gallaway,  then  head 
of the Domestic  Nuclear  Detection  Office, 
testified before Congress on  the challenge of 
interdicting attempts to smuggle a nuclear 
device  into the United States.  Citing  a 
government  study, he noted that  “the most 
difficult scenario to counter  was the use of 
[general aviation] aircraft  delivering  a 
weapon from  outside the borders of the U.S. 
directly  to a  target.”  Gallaway  observed that 
such  an attack  “would enable an  adversary  to 
bypass…multiple detection  and interdiction 
opportunities.” 49 Because a  system  to defeat 
this scenario would obviously  require great 
time and expense to implement,  and may 
ultimately  be unachievable, the decision to 
emphasize this attack  mode is curious. At  the 
very  least, Gallaway  may  have given 
adversaries inspiration  that  they  did not 
previously possess.
On the question  of giving terrorists novel 
ideas, commentators usually  argue that  our 
adversaries are sufficiently  clever  to discern 
the nation’s vulnerabilities.  As Cetron  avers, 
“I no longer  worry  about  giving the bad guys 
ideas…. They  will think of any  attack we 
can...” 50 Yet  a  private admission  by  al  Qaeda 
leader  Ayman al-Zawahiri  casts doubt  on  this 
assumption.   In a  captured 1999  memo to an 
associate,  Zawahiri conceded that  “Despite 
their  extreme danger,  we only  became aware 
of [biological  and chemical weapons] when 
the enemy  drew  our  attention  to them  by 
repeatedly  expressing  concerns that they  can 
be produced simply  with  easily  available 
materials.”51
The year  after  Zawahiri’s memo was 
written, columnist  Colbert I.  King authored a 
detailed scenario to highlight  the capital’s 
vulnerability.  King  described two heavily 
armed terrorists seizing control of the 
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Washington  Monument, blocking  the 
staircases with  explosives,  and firing  from  the 
windows with  a  .50 caliber  rifle.52 In  his view, 
“Gain  control  of the monument  and you  hold 
sway  over  a  large area  of the world’s most 
powerful capital, at  least  for  several days.”   So 
attractive is the scenario, he suggests, that 
the monument  “easily  makes a  terrorist’s 
list.” 53 Some variation  of this rationale is the 
default  response of those who publicly 
speculate about  terrorist  scenarios and wish 
to avoid criticism  for  doing  so. However,  an 
argument can  be made that his attack  had not 
occurred to a single terrorist  before King 
described it. Elliot  Panek considers this 
question  in  assessing  the effect  of “Wisdom  of 
Crowds wiki-logic”  in  the context  of 
terrorism, or  whether  aggregating  creative 
scenarios constitutes “doing the terrorists’ 
work  for  them.” 54 He notes that  generating 
plausible scenarios requires considerable 
thoughtfulness,  and while “[o]ne writer  (e.g., 
Tom  Clancy) could be pretty  good at that, and 
a  bunch  of devoted terrorists could be just  as 
good if not  better…a larger  group of well-
educated,  creative people…would certainly  be 
better  at it  than  either  Clancy  or  the 
terrorist.”  Panek rejects the assumption  that 
terrorists have already  conceived of every 
brilliant scenario,  arguing  that  “the most 
sophisticated think tank is probably  no match 
for  the collective wisdom  of the [New  York 
Times] readership…” 55
However  irresponsible these descriptions, 
authors who publish  them  usually  insist  that 
terrorists could, with  the proper  effort  and 
imagination,  conceive them  without 
assistance.   The same is true for  the 
identification  of domestic  vulnerabilities. 
What  distinguishes the final species of 
information  considered in  this article is its 
inaccessibility  to all but the most  rarefied 
circle of thinkers.  If the first two categories 
concern  insights that would be difficult  for 
adversaries to gain  themselves, the last 
consists of information that  requires the 
complicity of a third party.  
PUBLISHING POTENTIALLY  HARMFUL 
INFORMATION
Sensitive information  is often  revealed in  the 
service of a  beneficial purpose even  if its 
immediate impact appears harmful.   One 
famous case fitting  this description  is the 
New  York Times’ revelation  of the Bush 
administration’s domestic wiretapping 
program. After  first  learning of the program, 
the Times’ refrained from  publishing the 
story  for  a year,  in  part  due to the urging  of 
administration  officials.56 In  December 2005, 
just before publishing their  sensational 
scoop, journalist  Eric Lichtblau  and the 
newspaper’s editors were summoned to the 
White House,  where these officials again 
attempted to dissuade them  from  going to 
print. Their  case was compelling: disclosure 
of the program  would instantly  eliminate its 
effectiveness and place American  lives in 
danger.  As Lichtblau  later  recounted,  “the 
message was unmistakable: If the New  York 
Times  went ahead and published this story, 
we would share the blame for  the next 
terrorist  attack.” 57  This argument  was 
ultimately  unpersuasive, although  the Times’ 
account of the program  did omit certain 
sensitive details.58 While the revelation  was 
highly  controversial—President Bush 
described it  as “a  shameful  act”  – the story 
prompted a  constructive  national  debate on 
wartime executive power. 59  Many  civil 
libertarians applauded the skepticism  of a 
press corps that since 9/11  had been supine in 
its coverage of the administration’s 
counterterrorism policies.
In  other  cases,  dissemination  of sensitive 
information  resembles plain  vandalism. This 
motive is evident in  the work of John Young, 
founder  of the web site Cryptome.org. 60 
Young’s hobby  is to make public the 
government’s most  closely  held secrets, his 
motivation  appearing to extend no further 
than  his conviction  that  “There’s nothing  that 
should be secret. Period.” 61  Among  the 
information  he has published are the 
locations of nuclear  weapon  storage facilities 
a n d t h e h o m e a d d r e s s e s o f s e n i o r 
government officials.62  In  2009, Young 
embarrassed TSA  by  posting  an  inadequately 
redacted manual that  included airport  metal 
detectors settings and a  list of countries 
whose passport-holders require special 
scrutiny. 63 The following month  he posted a 
similar  document  on  screening  procedures 
for  explosive residue in  checked baggage.64 
While these revelations have an  impish 
quality,  an argument  can  be made that they 
impose greater  discipline on  the government 
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to protect  sensitive information, if only  to 
avoid embarrassment. The same cannot be 
said for  the amateur  satellite trackers who 
gleefully  publish  the orbital inclinations of 
classified U.S.  satellites.  This phenomenon 
l e d a c o m m i s s i o n o n  t h e N a t i o n a l 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO),  which 
operates the nation’s spy  satellites,  to note 
that “public speculation  on  how  NRO 
satellites are used has aided terrorists and 
other  potential adversaries in  developing 
techniques of denial  and deception  to thwart 
U.S.  intelligence efforts.” 65  Despite this 
admonition, the  practice continues,  most 
recently  in  2010 when the orbit  of the 
Pentagon’s classified X-37B spacecraft  was 
revealed less than a month after its launch.66  
Though  the damage that results from 
these revelations may  be quite severe,  those 
who make them  often belong to professions 
whose ethic sometimes requires disdain  for 
government  secrecy.  In  other  cases the 
disseminators are everyday  citizens with  a 
penchant  for  mischief.  In  recent  years, 
neither  group has been  particularly  amenable 
to pleas for  discretion.   The government  has 
had greater  success in managing the 
communication  of another  cohort—scientists 
who conduct  “dual-use”  research. However, 
several recent  lapses in  caution  among this 
group demonstrate the continued risk  that 
attends the dissemination  of sensitive 
information.
Dual-Use Scientific Research
In  the early  1980s,  many  U.S.  officials grew 
concerned that  the Soviet  Union  was 
c o m p e n s a t i n g  f o r i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
inadequacy  by  mining  the U.S. scientific 
literature. A 1982  incident  conveys the 
climate at  the time.  Days before a  major 
engineering  conference,  the Department  of 
Defense (DoD) blocked the delivery  of more 
than  100  unclassified papers on the grounds 
that  Soviet  bloc representatives would be 
present  at  the conference. 67  In response to 
the broader  concern, the National  Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) convened the Panel on 
Scientific Communication  and National 
Security  to explore tighter  controls on 
academic  communication.68  While federal 
law  grants broad authority  to classify 
scientific  research  and thereby  restrict  its 
publication, deference to scientific openness 
had made the government reluctant to 
exercise this power. 69  The panel’s findings, 
known as the Corson  Report,  acknowledged 
that  a  Soviet intelligence-gathering effort  was 
directed at  the American sc ient i f ic 
community  and that  a  substantial transfer  of 
U.S. technology  had indeed occurred. 
However, the panel determined that 
American  universities,  and open  scientific 
communication more generally,  were the 
source of very  little of this transfer. 
Moreover, it  concluded that formal policies to 
restrict  scientific  communication  “could be 
extremely  damaging to overall [U.S.] 
scientific  and economic advance as well as to 
military  progress.”   Calling for  a  strategy  of 
“security  by  accomplishment”  rather  than 
secrecy, the  report argued that  the “limited 
and uncertain benefits of such controls are, 
except in  isolated areas, outweighed by  the 
importance of scientific progress...” 70 Though 
the demise of the Soviet  Union  appeared to 
vindicate this conclusion,  the emergence of 
transnational terrorism  revived the unease 
that  inspired the Corson  panel.  Rather  than 
the loss of military  technology, recent 
anxieties have centered on publications in the 
life sciences and their  potential utility  to 
bioterrorists.
The danger of publishing  sensitive 
scientific  material  was powerfully  illustrated 
by  a group of Australian  scientists conducting 
pest control research  in  the late 1990s. 71 In  a 
now-infamous experiment, the scientists 
inserted the interleukin-4  gene into the 
mousepox virus with  the aim  of producing  an 
“infectious contraceptive”  for  mice.72  Rather 
than  sterilizing  the subjects,  however,  the 
modified mousepox  killed them,  including 
many  mice  that  had been  immunized against 
the unaltered virus.  The implications were 
ominous – a similar  modification  could yield 
vaccine-resistant  viruses that  are lethal  to 
humans, including smallpox.  Both  the 
scientists and the editors of the journal  to 
which  the work was submitted understood its 
potential for  misuse. 73  Their  controversial 
decision  to publish was based on  the 
conclusion  that  the crucial  elements of the 
research  had already  appeared elsewhere and 
that  so much  dangerous information  was 
already  available that  one additional article 
would be inconsequential.74 Nonetheless, the 
mousepox episode would be the catalyst  for 
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yet  another NAS study  on  the dangers of 
scientific  communication.75  Yet  even  before 
its commencement,  scrutiny  of dual-use 
research  had greatly  increased in  the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks.
The d i lemma in  publ i sh ing  such 
information  is a  familiar  one. While certain 
scientific  findings could aid malevolent 
actors, failing  to air  them  in  the open 
literature might  inhibit  research  that holds 
the key  to the defense.   After  contemplating 
this quandary,  the American  Society  for 
Microbiology  released guidelines in  2002  for 
reviewing  manuscripts submitted to the 
journals under  its purview. Under this 
voluntary  process, peer reviewers would alert 
editors if material “might  be misused or 
might  pose a  threat  to public health  safety,” 
and a  determination would be made 
concerning modifications.76  (While only  a 
handful of manuscripts have since been 
flagged, editors have deleted sensitive details 
on  several  occasions. 77)  The following  year, 
the editors and publishers of the nation’s 
leading  life-science journals met to discuss 
the publication  of such  information. During 
this meeting, a  near-consensus emerged that 
“there is information  that…presents enough 
risk of use by  terrorists that  it  should not be 
published.”  The group recommended that  in 
circumstances in  which  the potential danger 
of publication  exceeds the potential  benefit  to 
the public,  sensitive papers should be 
modified or  not  published at  all.  In  these 
cases, alternative means of communication 
such  as academic seminars should be used to 
minimize the risk of misuse. 78 The eventual 
NAS report  also reflected a  preference for 
self-regulation,  noting  that  “imposing 
mandatory  information controls on  research 
in  the life sciences…[would]  be difficult  and 
expensive with  little likely  gain  in  genuine 
security.” 79  As an  alternative to government 
oversight,  the NAS panel endorsed the 
concept  of “voluntary  self-governance of the 
scientific community  rather  than formal 
regulation by government.” 80
The presumption underlying  this system  is 
that  scientists will  censor  themselves 
responsibly,  obviat ing the need for 
government  oversight,  and that there will  be 
agreement  on what  should not be published. 
The mousepox  case calls both  of these 
assumptions into question. After a  review  of 
the case,  the editor of the Journal of Virology 
expressed no misgivings about  the decision to 
publish.81  Likewise,  the NAS panel deemed 
the publication  “appropriate,”  stating  that 
there was “little technical information that 
was not  already  abundantly  available in  the 
literature.”82 Moreover, the research  “alerted 
the scientific community  to such  a  possibility 
o c c u r r i n g  e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o r 
spontaneously.” 83  However, at least one of 
the researchers involved in  the experiment 
later  expressed misgivings about  its merit. 
Dr.  Ian Ramshaw  noted that even  before 
discovering a  method to increase the lethality 
of pox  viruses, his team  had stumbled upon 
another “dual-use dilemma”  – creating an 
agent of contagious sterility  – that  was 
scarcely  less sinister.  As a  weapon  against 
humans, Ramshaw  considered this “as bad as 
making  a  virus that kills the individual”  and 
concluded that  the original research  “should 
never have started in the first place.” 84
Another  article published after  the NAS 
report  reinforces the limits of self-censorship. 
In  2005,  the Proceedings  of the National 
A c a d e m y o f S c i e n c e s  a p p r o v e d f o r 
publication  the research  of Stanford 
University  scholars Lawrence Wein  and Yifan 
Liu, who had analyzed a  release of botulinum 
toxin  in  the milk  distribution system.85 Wein 
and Liu  had determined that  absent 
detection, an  attack  involving  less than  1g of 
the toxin  would poison  100,000 people. 86 
Among  this exposed group, Wein  later 
elaborated, more than  half would likely 
perish.87 Just  prior  to publication,  an  official 
of the Department  of Health  and Human 
Services requested that the journal  hold the 
piece, calling it  “a  road map for  terrorists.” 88 
After  a  brief delay  to review  the request,  the 
editors proceeded with  publication,  which 
NAS president Dr.  Bruce Alberts defended by 
noting  that  all of the information  that  could 
be useful to terrorists was “immediately 
accessible…through  a  simple Google 
search.”89  This is a  familiar,  yet  spurious, 
defense.  Putting aside that  simply  conceiving 
the attack  mode is an  important  element of 
every  plot,  the  existence of information  on 
the Internet is not  evidence of i ts 
h a r m l e s s n e s s . D i s p a r a t e , m u n d a n e 
information  can  be aggregated in  such  a  way 
that the ultimate product is highly sensitive.
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Aggregating Sensitive Public 
Information
The “Nth Country” experiment,  a  little-known 
exercise during  the Cold War, illustrates the 
potential dividend that  open-source research 
can  yield. In 1964, the U.S.  government 
recruited three young  physics postdocs with 
no knowledge of nuclear  weapons and tasked 
them  with  designing  a  bomb with  a 
“militarily  significant yield”  using  only  open-
source literature.   To the dismay  of many 
officials,  their ultimate design  was deemed 
workable. 90  In  a  later  instance,  journalist 
Howard Morland used public  information 
and expert  interviews to approximate the 
design  of a  hydrogen  bomb, which he 
described in  a  piece for  Progressive 
magazine.91  After  receiving  a copy  of the 
article,  the government  attempted to 
suppress its publication, setting  off a  highly 
public  legal battle. 92  Only  after  similar 
information  appeared in  a  separate 
publication  – its author  inspired by  the 
Progressive  case to commit an  act of civil 
disobedience – did the government  cease its 
attempt to silence Morland.93
A  more recent  case involves the doctoral 
dissertation  of Sean  Gorman, a George 
Mason University  graduate student. Gorman 
and his research  partner  used public 
information  culled from  the Internet to map 
the fiber-optic network that connects 
American  industry. The result was a  tool that 
a  government  official  described as a 
“ c o o k b o o k o f h o w  t o e x p l o i t  t h e 
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f o u r  n a t i o n ’ s 
infrastructure.” 94 According  to its description 
in  the press, the tool allowed a  user  to “click 
on  a  bank  in Manhattan  and see who has 
communication  lines running into it and 
where… [or] drill  into a  cable  trench  between 
Kansas and Colorado and determine how  to 
create the most havoc with  a  hedge clipper.” 
When the pair  presented their  research  to a 
room  full of chief information  officers of U.S. 
financial firms, it was suggested that they  not 
be allowed to leave with  their  briefing. At  the 
urging  of government officials, the university 
directed that  only  general summaries of their 
findings be published.95  This outcome, in 
which  private citizens acted voluntarily  to 
mollify  the government,  provides some 
optimism  that  sensitive information  can  be 
protected without formal  restrictions. Yet  the 
ad hoc  nature of these interventions,  and the 
absence of a  culture of discretion  that  would 
make them  unnecessary,  ensures that much 
dangerous knowledge will  continue to be 
available.
IMPLICATIONS
Perhaps the greatest  obstacle to sanitizing 
discussion of sensitive information  is the 
unresolved question  of its harmfulness.  Since 
9/11,  vulnerabilities have been  identified in 
countless targets without terrorists ’ 
exploiting  them.   Several  high-impact, easily 
replicable attacks have occurred and have not 
been  copied.  Consider, for  example, the 
Beltway  Sniper  attacks, in  which  two snipers 
killed 10  people from  a  converted sedan  in 
October  2002. These shootings fairly 
traumatized the Washington, D.C., area  and 
are often  cited as an  ideal template for  future 
attacks.96  Yet  after  eight  years no similar 
attack  has occurred.  The few  attacks that 
have been attempted,  such  as Najibullah 
Zazi’s 2009  plot  to bomb the New  York City 
s u b w a y , h a v e r e q u i r e d n o s p e c i a l 
choreography  or  insight into security  gaps. 97 
While  this observation  might  explain  the 
c o m p l a c e n c y  s u r r o u n d i n g s e n s i t i v e 
information, a  spectacular  attack  may  quickly 
invalidate it,  especially  if such  information 
turns out  to have enabled its success.  The 
d a n g e r  o f d i s s e m i n a t i n g  s e n s i t i v e 
information  should be evaluated a priori and 
not on the basis of recent experience.
If one accepts the premise that  sensitive 
information  may  be useful to attentive 
adversaries, the central question is how  to 
manage this information  more appropriately. 
Previous wartime restrictions on  speech  are 
n e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e n o r 
technologically  feasible in the present day. 
Perhaps the most famous of these is the 1917 
Espionage Act, which  criminalized the 
transmission  of “information  relating  to the 
national defense”  to the country’s enemies. 98 
Latter-day  incarnations of this law  were 
proposed after 9/11,  such  as Dennis 
Pluchinsky’s suggestion—risible even  in  those 
fearful days – that  laws should be enacted 
“temporarily  restricting the media  from 
publishing  any  security  information that can 
be used by  our  enemies.” 99 Such  proposals 
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have little chance of enactment,  but 
variations are  being  pursued that are only 
slightly  less troubling.  The following 
discussion  examines the efficacy  of the 
government’s usual  approach  to managing 
sensitive information.  Additionally, several 
alternatives are put  forward that are both  less 
intrusive and potentially  more effective than 
the bald restrictions on  speech  that  are often 
proposed.
The Perils of Censorship
Even  when  the government has legitimate 
objections to the release of information, 
either  classified or  merely  sensitive,  efforts to 
suppress its publication  occasionally 
backfire.100 This occurred in 1979  when  the 
government  attempted to censor  Howard 
Morland’s hydrogen bomb article.  Hugh  E. 
DeWitt, a  retired government physicist,  noted 
then  that  the genesis of the controversy  was 
the Department  of Energy’s (DOE)  response 
to Progressive’s  editors,  who had submitted 
Morland’s manuscript  for  confirmation  of its 
technical  accuracy.  According  to DeWitt, 
“Had [DOE] responded with  their  usual  curt 
‘no comment’ the article would have 
appeared, attracted little attention, and been 
quickly  forgotten.” 101  The pursuit of an 
injunction  implicitly  confirmed the value of 
its content.  A  similar  episode unfolded in  late 
2010  when  the Pentagon purchased and 
destroyed 9,500 copies of Operation Dark 
Heart, the memoir  of a  former intelligence 
officer  in  Afghanistan.102  DoD officials had 
determined that  the book  contained classified 
operational  details.  However,  because dozens 
of advance copies had already  been 
distributed, comparison  of the censored 
second printing  with  the original  work 
allowed for the identification  of its sensitive 
revelations.103 As a  result  of the publicity,  the 
redacted version  of the book  soon topped 
Amazon’s bestseller list. 104
Stil l more vexing  than  protecting 
appropriately  classified information, which 
the government has a  clear justification to 
safeguard, is managing  the potential  harm  of 
unclassified information in  the public 
domain. As Science Editor-in-Chief Donald 
Kennedy  notes,  “[government officials]  can’t 
order  the nonpublication  of a  paper  just 
because they  consider  the findings ‘sensitive.’ 
No such category  short  of classification 
exists…” 105 Often  the appropriate response is 
not to impose formal restrictions at  all, which 
are likely  to be ineffective,  incompatible with 
the First  Amendment,  or  both. Indeed, the 
government’s inability  to silence WikiLeaks 
illustrates its impotence in  policing speech  in 
the Internet age.106  Public leaders should 
instead promote a  culture of voluntary 
restraint,  in  which  gratuitous revelations of 
sensitive information are collectively  frowned 
upon. After  9/11,  the government  took 
tentative steps to encourage this approach, 
but they  rarely  extended beyond the advice 
issued by  the National  Infrastructure 
Protection  Center,  which  asked Americans to 
“apply  common  sense in  deciding  what  to 
publish  on  the Internet.” 107  While many 
commentators would ignore any  request to 
r e f r a i n  f r o m  p u b l i s h i n g  s e n s i t i v e 
information,  even  a  small reduction in 
irresponsible discussion  would be preferable 
to the current paradigm.
Self-restraint as a Civic Duty
Changes in  societal mores are probably  more 
re s p ons ib l e t han  any  t e chnol og ica l 
development for  the increased traffic in 
sensit ive information.  Irresponsible 
disclosures frequently  occur without  any 
social penalty  for those who make them. This 
represents a  dramatic  shift  from  earlier 
generations,  when  cooperation  with  the 
government  on  security  matters was more 
uniform. In  one well-known  example, 
American  physic ists refrained from 
publishing results on nuclear  fission 
experiments during  World War  II for  fear of 
assisting  the Nazi bomb program.108  Even 
among  provocateurs,  there is precedent for 
self-restraint.  Daniel Ellsberg’s name is 
synonymous with  exposing  government 
secrets, having leaked the Pentagon  Papers. 
Yet  Ellsberg conscientiously  withheld four 
volumes regarding  sensitive negotiations out 
of concern that they  would disrupt the peace 
process. 109 Such  discretion can  still  be found, 
although it is uncommon enough  to be 
conspicuous. In  their  analysis of radiological 
terrorism, for  example,  James Acton et  al. 
stopped short  of revealing a  radiation 
immersion scenario that they  claimed would 
“readily  kill several hundreds and disrupt  a 
large city.”  As for  the specifics of the plot, 
they  wrote,  “We will  not  describe it.” 110 In an 
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earlier  episode, the government  sought a 
voluntary  embargo of the details of a  1984 
incident  in  which  religious cultists poisoned 
751  people in  Oregon  with  Salmonella. 
Fearing  the attack would inspire copycats, 
officials asked the Journal of the American 
Medical Association  to refrain  from 
describing  the method for  twelve years; the 
editors agreed.111
As an alternative to formal restrictions on 
communication, professional  societies and 
influential figures should promote voluntary 
self-censorship as a  civic  duty.  As this 
practice is already  accepted among many 
scientists, it  may  be transferrable to members 
of other professions. As part  of this effort, 
formal channels should be established in 
which  citizens can alert  the government to 
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d o t h e r  s e n s i t i v e 
information  without  exposing it to a wide 
audience.  Concurrent  with  this campaign 
should be the stigmatization of those who 
recklessly  disseminate sensitive information. 
This censure would be aided by  the fact  that 
many  such  people are unattractive figures 
whose writings betray  their intellectual 
vanity.  The public  should be quick to furnish 
the opprobrium  that presently  escapes these 
individuals.  
The need to influence the behavior  of 
scientists is particularly  acute.  The Corson 
panel,  while expressing  little enthusiasm  for 
restrictions on  scientific communication, 
noted the existence of a  category  of research 
that  merited “limited restrictions short  of 
classification”  on  a  largely  voluntary  basis. 
This category  represented a  “gray  area”  lying 
between  research  that  can  be discussed 
openly  and that which  the government has 
good cause to classify. 112 While the need for 
voluntary  self-censorship among  scientists is 
already  well recognized, there is still  some 
resistance to the idea  that  scientific 
communication  should ever  be constrained. 
To wit, one of the researchers involved in  the 
Australian  mousepox  experiment defended 
their  publication  on the grounds that 
“Anything  scientifically  interesting  should be 
published.” 113  An  effort  must  be made to 
temper this attitude and make clear  that  the 
pursuit  of scientific knowledge does not 
abso lve re se arche rs o f the i r  soc ia l 
responsibility.
An  understandable objection to self-
censorship arises when one considers that 
huge quantities of classified  information  are 
being maliciously  leaked under  the auspices 
of WikiLeaks.  It  might seem  curious to 
criticize well-meaning  professionals for 
discussing  unclassified information  that  is far 
less damaging  than the genuine secrets being 
revealed.  Yet the nihilism  of this small group 
is not  the standard against  which  one’s 
actions should be measured. Nor  does it 
release conscientious citizens from  their  duty 
not to endanger the nation.
Self-censorship among Journalists
Outside of the laboratory, discretion  in 
national security  matters is nowhere more 
important than  in the field  of journalism. The 
World War  II-era  Office of Censorship owed 
much  of its success to the voluntary 
cooperation of the press.114  The relationship 
between  the government  and the media  is 
more adversarial today,  but  vestiges of past 
cooperation  remain.  For example, in 
journalist  Bob  Woodward’s account  of the 
2007  troop “surge” in  Iraq,  he pointedly 
refused to describe a secret  technology  used 
to target  insurgent leaders, which  he credited 
with  much  of the campaign’s success.115  In 
o t h e r  c a s e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  j o u r n a l i s t s ’ 
carelessness has caused considerable damage 
to the nation’s security. The authorized 
biography  of Timothy  McVeigh  provides a 
useful example. Based on  interviews with 
McVeigh, two journalists described in  detail 
the bomb he used in  the Oklahoma City 
attack,  including  its triply  redundant  fusing 
mechanism. 116  Because information  that 
appears in  major  newspapers or  works from 
leading  publishing  houses bears a  certain 
institutional  imprimatur,  terrorists may  find 
it  useful. Would-be bombers face the 
dilemma of not  knowing  which  of the 
multitude of Internet bomb designs are 
feasible, and operational  security  may 
preclude their  testing  a  device. Given  that 
McVeigh’s design  had been  dramatically 
demonstrated,  detailed instructions on  how 
to replicate it  should not  have been 
provided.117
Even more important  than  omitting 
certain sensitive details is to refrain  from 
sensational reporting that  magnifies rather 
than  diminishes security  threats. Calling 
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attention  to alarming information,  ostensibly 
to prompt its redress, may  instead compound 
the danger, especially  if a  remedy  is not 
practicable.  Once such  incident  took place in 
1975  when  Britain’s Sunday Times  reported 
that  the U.K. patent  office had allowed the 
formerly  secret  formula  for  the VX  nerve 
agent  to be published. 118  British  officials 
scrambled to remove the of fending 
documents from  public libraries.119 However, 
far  from  eliminating a  threat,  the story  drew 
attention  to information that  was already 
widely  available, having  been  declassified in 
several countries years before.120 One British 
patent  agent  noted that  “without the 
indiscretion  of the Sunday Times  an  amateur 
would have been  unable to identify  and locate 
the relevant  document.”121 Worse, according 
to Geoffrey  Forden,  the Times  story  was the 
catalyst  that initiated Iraq’s nerve gas 
program.122 Another  example can  be found in 
the reporting  on the WikiLeaks releases. 
Several media  outlets described a  leaked 
State Department  cable  that listed sites 
around the world whose destruction would 
“critically  impact”  U.S. national security. 
Among these were African  mines that 
produce cobalt  and bauxite as well as 
locations where underwater  communications 
cables reach  land.  One article defended these 
revelations on the specious grounds that  “any 
would-be terrorist with  Internet  access and a 
bit of ingenuity  might quickly  have 
identified”  the sites.123 Yet  as a  result  of this 
carelessness,  a  terrorist  would require neither 
ingenuity  nor  the  patience to scour  thousands 
of leaked documents to identify  the most 
sensitive information.
Journalists should be encouraged to resist 
the notoriety  that  attends such  reporting  by 
appeals to their  sense of civic  responsibility. 
However,  it  is not  the purpose of this essay  to 
suggest that self-censorship should always be 
the default response when  sensitive 
information  is obtained.  The media’s role in 
exposing  government incompetence plays a 
crucial  function  in  maintaining the nation’s 
civic  hygiene, and revealing  secrets is 
occasionally  necessary  for  this purpose. Yet 
for  revelations that  potentially  threaten 
public safety,  a set  of criteria should be 
established that assist  the media  in  choosing 
responsibly  between silence and disclosure. 
Regarding  security  vulnerabilities,  the crucial 
question  is whether  the potential exists for 
timely  remediation. If it  does not,  little is 
gained by  drawing attention  to weaknesses in 
the nation’s defenses. An  additional 
determinant  should be whether  alternative 
mechanisms exist  to alert the government  to 
a  deficiency. Here the government  has a  clear 
responsibility  to ensure that  public exposés 
are not  the only  means to correct a 
shortcoming in security.
CONCLUSION
Whatever  the excesses of the U.S. response to 
9/11,  avoiding  wholesale restrictions on  the 
discuss ion  of sensi t ive informat ion 
represents a  triumph  of moderation.  Yet  in 
o u r  r e v e r e n c e f o r  f r e e e x p r e s s i o n , 
communication  has been tolerated that 
carries considerable security  risks while 
delivering  questionable benefits to society. 
Greater discipline can  be imposed on  the 
discussion of sensitive information without 
formal, coercive restrictions on speech. 
Indeed, this effort  should be predicated on 
forestalling even  greater  erosions of liberties 
that  may  occur  after another  devastating 
attack.
Just  as the evolution  of social  mores has 
been a  factor  in  making  irresponsible 
communication  more acceptable,  efforts to 
discourage these discussions should center 
on  challenging  their  basic  appropriateness. 
Civic and professional leaders possess 
considerable power  to influence popular 
perception. This power  should be harnessed 
to place the burden of policing  irresponsible 
discussion  squarely  in  the hands of the 
public. Its success will ultimately  be achieved 
not  by  coercion  but  by  persuasion – 
specifically,  by  convincing citizens that  the 
government  is not the sole arbiter of the 
sensi t iv i ty  of information  and that 
responsibility  for  protecting the nation 
extends to every citizen who possesses it.
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